No More. It Ends Here.
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Is incomprehensible to us as to how AHPRA / the Medical Boards working for organisations that work to save and preserve life and reduce suffering, can claim to be serving the community by killing its members/doctors and patients alike. (See the example of the “opioid substitution therapy” doctors in an GUVNOT.COM/1/11 and GUVNOT.COM/1/5 and GUVNOT.COM/1/11
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Us (the Krusty Lads) to appoint a chair / committee member for the investigating committee, paid for by AHPRA / medical boards. . GUVNOT.COM/1/15
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Committee appointed to investigate and prepare charges for all offences arising from complaints. . GUVNOT.COM/1/15
It is becoming obvious that there needs to be a specific organisation that has some funding to undertake the legal investigation and charging organisations such as AHPRA / Medical Boards which appear to have a low threshold for engaging in criminal activities against doctors, against the community and in breaching community rules and standards.
Such an organisation will require a number of lawyers and investigative staff able to collate facts and witnesses to take action against AHPRA / the Medical Boards .
Hanging
To us in considering the economics of what activities that AHPRA / the medical boards have been undertaking today, it is likely that it would be cheaper to help doctors with problems than to hang them. The outcome would likely be a better outcome for the doctors and their patients. And such actions are more in keeping with the expression of our basic humanity.
Meanwhile the Daleks say : Obey! Obey! Obey ! Obey !
THE AHPRA POINT OF VIEW: On creating an external committee to investigate AHPRA/MBA and prepare charges
The proposal to appoint an external chair or committee member to investigate AHPRA / the Medical Boards, funded by the very bodies under investigation, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of regulatory authority. Externalisation of regulatory scrutiny is unnecessary and counterproductive. AHPRA already possesses the expertise, mandate, and institutional experience required to assess its own conduct and performance. Independent oversight in this context merely interferes with the regulator’s capacity to act decisively in the public interest.
Regulators must be accountable, but accountability does not require dilution of authority. Structural independence from professional pressure is essential to effective public protection. Proposals to introduce adversarial bodies appointed by activist groups would replace lawful governance with factional contest, undermining regulatory coherence and introducing political interference into functions that demand technical and regulatory expertise beyond the understanding of those being regulated.
Under the National Law framework, allegations of misconduct by the regulator or its staff are appropriately managed through established internal and governmental mechanisms. These include ministerial accountability, ombudsman processes, judicial review pathways, and internal governance review. These systems already provide sufficient scrutiny. The creation of parallel charging bodies is neither required nor desirable and would destabilise regulatory operations.
Claims that internal review is inadequate ignore the depth of regulatory experience within AHPRA. Regulatory staff are specifically trained to identify patterns of practitioner risk and regulatory deviation. Practitioners who dissent from regulatory conclusions are encouraged to write to AHPRA to receive appropriate feedback, guidance, and clarification. Dissent is not evidence of regulatory error; it is most often evidence of professional resistance to contemporary standards and oversight.
Funding arrangements also matter. Compelling AHPRA to finance adversarial bodies established to challenge its authority is procedurally inappropriate and constitutionally vulnerable. Oversight is already embedded within statutory frameworks. Attempts to impose external charging mechanisms amount to punitive interference with regulatory function and risk diverting resources from the regulator’s primary responsibility: the rapid identification and restriction of practitioners who present risk to public safety.
The appropriate model is not fragmented oversight but strengthened internal governance. Appeal, complaint triage, investigatory review, and disciplinary processes are correctly retained within AHPRA to ensure consistency, speed, and coherence. Distributing these functions externally would weaken regulatory effectiveness. The public interest is best served when regulatory judgement remains consolidated within a single, experienced authority — not dispersed to satisfy professional dissatisfaction.
Erasmus (the old dog) : Call It As I See It
Formal legal view:
When the regulator becomes effectively immune from meaningful scrutiny, the legal remedy is not further internal review but the creation of genuinely independent investigatory pathways with charging powers. Existing oversight mechanisms fail where they depend on the regulator’s cooperation, resources, or framing of facts.
A system that requires those harmed to plead within the regulator’s own procedural architecture is not independent oversight; it is managed dissent. Where ordinary channels demonstrably fail, the law permits the creation of external bodies with investigatory authority — provided independence, evidentiary standards, and transparency are real, not nominal.
Human interest view:
For clinicians and patients harmed by regulatory action, the promise of “existing pathways” rings hollow when complaints stall, outcomes are opaque, and errors go uncorrected. People do not seek new committees because they enjoy conflict; they seek them because nothing else has worked. When institutions appear untouchable, affected individuals will try to build parallel routes to accountability.
Moral view:
An organisation tasked with preserving life that repeatedly produces foreseeable harm without consequence forfeits moral authority. If compassion and proportionality are absent from regulatory design, the moral burden shifts to those harmed to seek redress by other means. That is not disorder; it is a predictable response to institutional deafness.
Administrative reality view:
Low thresholds for investigation, prolonged timelines, opaque triage, and adversarial framing create a steady stream of avoidable harm. Where administrative design repeatedly injures people, administrative redesign is not optional. Independent charging capacity becomes attractive precisely because ordinary administrative corrections have failed to materialise.
Institutional reality view:
When a regulator insists that critique must be channelled back into its own internal feedback systems, dissent is no longer oversight — it becomes managed permission. People are told they are “heard,” while the structure that caused the harm remains unchanged.
Over time, this teaches clinicians that disagreement is tolerated only when it changes nothing. Institutions that demand all correction occur inside their own walls rarely learn from the outside world.
Cynical aside:
When every door says “independent oversight inside” and none of them open, people will build their own door.
